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Abstract
The auction algorithm is an effective method for solving the classical assignment problem. It admits an
intuitive economic interpretation and it is well suited for implementation in massivelly parallel computing
systems. In this paper we generalize the auction algorithm to solve linear minimum cost network flow
problems. We discuss several variations, and we demonstrate that the auction algorithm for transportation
problems of [BeC88] and the E-relaxation method of [Ber86a] and [Ber86b] are obtained as special cases. We
show that a relatively simple implementation of the algorithm requires O(N3 log(NC)) operations, where
N is the number of nodes and C is the maximum absolute value of arc cost coefficient. Finally, we discuss
computational issues and we show that for at least some classes of bipartite problems, the auction algorithm
outperforms substantially current state-of-the-art algorithms.
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1. INTRODUCTION
We introduce the optimal network flow problem that is the subject of this paper. Consider a
directed graph with node set IV and arc set A, with each arc (i, j) having a cost coefficient aij.
Letting fij be the flow of the arc (i,j), the problem is
minimize E aijfij (LNF)
(i,j)EA
subject to
a, fij - fji = si, V i E , (1)
fjl(ij)EA} fjl(j,i)EA}
bij < fij < cij, V (i, j) E A, (2)
where aij, bij, cij, and si are given integers.
We denote by f the vector with elements fij, (i, j) E A. We refer to bij and cij, and the interval
[bij, cij] as the flow bounds and the feasible flow range of arc (i, j), respectively. We refer to si as
the supply of node i. We refer to the contraints (1) and (2) as the conservation of flow constraints
and the capacity constraints respectively. A flow vector satisfying both of these constraints is called
feasible, and if it satisfies just the capacity constraints, it is called capacity-feasible. If there exists at
least one feasible flow vector, problem (LNF) is called feasible and otherwise it is called infeasible.
We assume that there exists at most one arc in each direction between any pair of nodes, but this
assumption is made for notational convenience and can be easily dispensed with. We denote the
numbers of nodes and arcs by N and A, respectively. We also denote by C the maximum absolute
value of the cost coefficients,
C = max laij .(ij)EA
We formulate a dual problem to (LNF) by associating a Lagrange multiplier pi with each con-
servation of flow constraint (1). Letting p be the vector with elements pi, i E JV, we can write the
corresponding Lagrangian function as
L(f,p)= a (aij+pj-Pi)fij + E siPi. (3)
(i,j)EA iEAr
One obtains the dual function value q(p) at a vector p by minimizing L(f, p) over all capacity-feasible
flows f. This leads to the dual problem
maximize q(p)
subject to no constraint on p,
with the dual functional q given by
q(p) = min{L(f,p) I bij < fij < cij,(i,j) E A} = E qij(pi -pj) + sipi, (5a)
(i,j)EA iEA
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where
qij(pi- pj) = min{(aij + pj -pi)fij I bij < fij < cij}. (5b)
This formulation of the dual problem has been used in many prior works dealing with relaxation
methods. We henceforth refer to (MCF) as the primal problem, and note that standard duality
results imply that the optimal primal cost equals the optimal dual cost. We refer to the dual
variable pi as the price of node i and we define the surplus of node i by
gi = fji - E fij + si. (6)
{jl(j,i)EA} {jl(i,j)EA}
A flow-price vector pair (f,p) is said to satisfy the complementary slackness conditions if f is
capacity-feasible and
fij < cij pi - pj < aij V (i,j) E A, (7a)
bij < fi pi - pj > aij (i,j) E A. (7b)
For a pair (f,p), complementary slackness and primal feasibility (gi = 0 for all i E M/) are the
necessary and sufficient conditions for f to be primal-optimal and p to be dual-optimal.
The form of the dual cost (5) motivates solution by Gauss-Seidel relaxation (or coordinate ascent
methods). A number of methods of this type have been developed recently, and have led to remark-
ably successful computer codes [BeT85], [BeT88]. The idea is to choose a single node i and change
its price pi in a direction of improvement of the dual cost, while keeping the other prices unchanged.
Unfortunately there is a fundamental problem; the dual cost q is piecewise linear, and the relaxation
idea may encounter difficulty at some "corner points", where the dual cost cannot be improved by
changing any single node price. The difficulty was overcome in [Ber82], [BeT85] by occasionally
allowing simultaneous price changes of several nodes. An alternative approach was introduced with
the auction algorithm for the assignment problem, first proposed in [Ber79], and with its extension
for problem (LNF), called e-relaxation, first proposed in [Ber86a] and [Ber86b]. The main idea is
to allow a single node price pi to change even if this worsens the dual cost. When pi is changed,
however, it is set to within a given e > 0 of the price that maximizes the dual cost along the ith
coordinate. Thus, if e is small enough, the algorithm can eventually approach the optimal solution.
The auction algorithm for the assignment problem may be viewed as essentially equivalent to the
e-relaxation method. In particular, the linear network flow problem (LNF) can be transformed into
an assignment problem ([BeT89], p. 335) and when the auction algorithm is applied in a particular
way to that problem, it yields a generic form of e-relaxation. At the same time, when e-relaxation is
applied to an assignment problem, the node order of (approximate) coordinate ascent can be chosen
in such a way as to replicate the auction algorithm. A precise description of this equivalence is given
in [BeE87] and [BeE88]. The main idea is that in an iteration of the auction algorithm, the price of
an unassigned person is implicitly raised through a "bid" as this person is assigned to a "preferred"
object (see [Ber88], and [BeT89], Section 5.3), and then the price of this object is also raised; if the
object was assigned to another person at the start of the iteration, the assignment to this person is
canceled. Raising the price of the object and canceling its prior assignment immediately following a
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bid for the object is an important feature that, we believe, accounts for the practical effectiveness of
the auction algorithm as documented in [Ber88], and [BeE88]. By contrast, experiments show that
the e-relaxation method applied to the assignment problem but without using the node ordering
implicit in the auction algorithm, is on the average far slower than the auction algorithm. This is
true even when the two methods are implemented so that their worst case complexity bound is the
same, and illustrates once more the fallacy of evaluating algorithms and implementations strictly on
the basis of a worst case complexity analysis.
The experimental observations just described motivate algorithms for problem (LNF) that are
similar to the e-relaxation method and incorporate some of the special features of the auction algo-
rithm. One such algorithm, called second order c-relaxation method [BeE87], did not prove successful
in computational experiments. Another algorithm, due to the authors [BeC88], extended the auc-
tion algorithm to solve uncapacitated transportation problems, and served as a starting point for
the present paper. A code based on this algorithm has proved to be substantially faster than state-
of-the-art primal simplex and relaxation codes for important classes of transportation problems
[BeC88].
The algorithm of this paper, similarly to the auction algorithm, involves the idea of occasionally
following a price increase of a node with price increases of several neighboring nodes; this operation,
called price rise of a subset of nodes, is formalized in the next section. Each increase of the price of
a neighboring node is made possible by flow changes of some of the incident arcs of the node. These
flow changes are called 6-pushes and collectively they constitute what is called a reject operation (see
the next section). Roughly, a reject operation corresponds to the cancellation of the prior assignment
of the object in the context of the auction algorithm, and results in larger price increases than the
ones corresponding to the e-relaxation method.
Aside from extending the earlier auction algorithms, our paper makes two additional contribu-
tions. First, it proves an O (N3 log(NC)) complexity bound that among others, applies to a suitable
implementation of our earlier auction algorithm for transportation problems [BeC88]; no polynomial
complexity analysis was available for this transportation algorithm. Second, the present paper pro-
vides a discussion of the rather complex computational aspects of auction algorithms, accompanied
by extensive testing with much larger sparse network problems than those used in tests so far. We
believe that experimentation with very large problems is essential to confirm theoretical and other
hypotheses about the relative effectiveness of various methods.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we introduce the basic building blocks
of our algorithms, including price rises of subsets of nodes, 6-pushes, and reject operations. We
also formulate and analyze a generic algorithm that contains as special cases the earlier auction
algorithms, the e-relaxation method, as well as the new algorithms of this paper.
In Section 3, we give our basic new method, called network auction algorithm. We discuss several
variations of the algorithm and we show that it contains as special cases the auction algorithms
proposed earlier.
In Section 4 we give the complexity analysis of the sweep implementation of the network auction
algorithm. This is a particularly simple and efficient implementation first introduced in [Ber86a]
in the context of the e-relaxation method (see also [BeE87] and [BeE88]). The theoretical as well
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as practical efficiency of our basic algorithm can be greatly improved through the use of scaling
ideas, the standard technique for improving the complexity of network flow algorithms [B1J85],
[EdK72], [Roc80]. With the use of scaling and the sweep implementation, we prove that the network
auction algorithm requires O(N31og(NC)) operations, similarly as the c-relaxation method. The
scaling approach adopted here is based on scaling the arc cost coefficients, successively representing
them with an increasing number of bits. This approach has been applied to the c-relaxation and
auction algorithms (see [BeE87], [BeE88], and [BeT89]). There is another scaling possibility, called
c-scaling, which consists of applying the network auction algorithm repeatedly with successively
smaller values of c, starting with a large value and ending with a sufficiently small value to guarantee
optimality of the final result. c-scaling was suggested in [Ber79] as a method for improving the
performance of the auction algorithm based on the results of computational experimentation. E-
scaling was used in [Gol86], which provided the first scaling analysis of the e-relaxation mehod
and gave an implementation with complexity O(NAlog(N)log(NC)). This implementation uses
a rather complicated dynamic tree data structure, and was more fully developed in [Gol87] and
[GoT87] along with several other implementations.
Finally, in Section 5 we discuss the effect of problem structure on the performance of auction
algorithms, based on intuition gained through extensive experimentation. The issues here cannot
be understood by complexity analysis, which turns out to be somewhat misleading. We also give
computational results for very large bipartite problems with two auction codes, called AUCTION (for
assignment) and TRANSAUCTION (for transportation), and with some state-of-the-art primal-dual
and relaxation methods.
2. BASIC OPERATIONS AND THE GENERIC ALGORITHM
The algorithms of this paper maintain a price vector p, and a capacity-feasible flow vector f,
such that f and p jointly satisfy a relaxed form of the usual complementary slackness conditions
known as c-complementary slackness (c-CS for short). e-CS was introduced in the context of the
original proposal of the auction algorithm for the assignment problem [Ber79], and was generalized
in [BeT85], [BHT87], [TsB87a], and [TsB87b] for other types of problems. Roughly, a flow-price
vector pair satisfies e-CS if it violates the usual complementary slackness condition by at most e on
each arc (see Section 2). In particular, we say that (f,p) satisfies c-CS if f is capacity-feasible and
fij < cij pi - pj < aij + e V (i,j) E A, (8a)
bji < fji pi - pj < -aji + e V (j,i) E A. (8b)
The usefulness of e-CS is due in large measure to the following proposition. A proof may be found
in [Ber86a], [BeE88], or [BeT89], p. 357.
Proposition 1: If c < 1/N, f is feasible, and f and p jointly satisfy c-CS, then f is optimal for
(LNF).
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We now define some terminology and computational operations that play a significant role in our
algorithms. Each of these definitions assumes that (f, p) is a flow-price vector pair satisfying e-CS,
and will be used only in that context.
Definition 1: An arc (i, j) is said to be c+-unblocked if
pi = pj + aij + e, fij < cij. (9)
An arc (j, i) is said to be c--unblocked if
pi = pj - aji + c, bji < fji. (10)
The push list of a node i, denoted Pi, is the (possibly empty) set of arcs (i, j) that are e+- unblocked,
denoted P+, and the arcs (j, i) that are e--unblocked, denoted Pi-. The reject capacity ri of node
i is defined as
r 0, if the push list Pi is empty,
ri {jil(ij)EP+}(ij -- fi ) + {jl(j,i)EP-}(fji-bji), otherwise. (11)
In all our algorithms, flow is allowed to increase only along c+-unblocked arcs and is allowed to
decrease only along c--unblocked arcs. Thus, the reject capacity ri gives the total amount of flow
that can be "pushed away" from node i. The next two definitions specify the type of flow changes
considered.
Definition 2: For an arc (i, j) [or arc (j, i)] of the push list Pi of node i, let 6 be a scalar such
that 0 < 6 < cij - fij (O < 6 < fji - bji, respectively). A 6-push at node i on arc (i,j) [(j,i),
respectively] consists of increasing the flow fij by 6 (decreasing the flow fji by 6, respectively), while
leaving all other flows, as well as the price vector unchanged. A saturating push of node i on are
(i, j) [arc (j, i), respectively] is a 6-push with 6 = cij - fij (6 = fji - bji, respectively).
Definition 3: A reject operation at node i consists of performing a saturating push on each of
the arcs in the push list of node i.
Note that in a reject operation at node i, the push list of i is emptied and the total amount of
flow "pushed away" from i is equal to the reject capacity ri. The next operation consists of raising
the prices of a subset of nodes by the maximum common increment y that will not violate e-CS.
Definition 4: A price rise of a nonempty, strict subset of nodes I (i.e., I $ 0, I $ N/), consists
of leaving unchanged the flow vector f and the prices of nodes not belonging to I, and of increasing
the prices of the nodes in I by the amount 7 given by
_ min{S+ U S-}, if S+ U S- 0, (17)
-O, if S+US- =0,
where S+ and S- are the sets of scalars given by
S+ = {pj + aij + e-pi I (i, j) E A such that i E I,j ¢ I, fij < cij}, (18)
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S- = (pj -aji + e-P pi I (j,i) E A such that i E I,j 4 I, fji > bji). (19)
In the case where the subset I consists of a single node i, a price rise of the singleton set {(i is also
referred to as a price rise of node i. If the price increment 7 of Eq. (17) is positive, the price rise
is said to be substantive and if 7 = 0, the price rise is said to be trivial. [Note that every scalar
in the sets S+ and S- of Eqs. (18) and (19) is nonnegative by the e-CS conditions (8a) and (8b),
respectively, so we have 1y 0.]
The generic algorithm to be described shortly consists of a sequence of 6-push, reject, and price
rise operations. The following lemma lists some properties of these operations that are important
in the context of the algorithm.
Lemma 1: Let (f, p) be a flow-price vector pair satisfying e-CS.
(a) The flow-price vector pair obtained following a 6-push, a reject operation, or a price rise
operation, satisfies c-CS.
(b) Let I be a subset of nodes such that ,EEI gi > 0. Then if the sets of scalars S+ and S- of
Eqs. (18) and (19) are empty, problem (LNF) is infeasible.
Proof: (a) By the definition of c-CS, the flow of an e+-unblocked and an c--unblocked arc can have
any value within the feasible flow range. Since a 6-push only changes the flow of an c+-unblocked or
c--unblocked arc, it cannot result in violation of e-CS. The same is true for a reject operation which
consists of a finite number of saturating push operations. If p and p' are the price vectors before
and after a price rise operation of a set I, respectively, we have that for all arcs (i, j) with i E I,
and j E I or with i 4 I and j ~ I, the c-CS condition (8) is satisfied by (f, p') since it is satisfied by
(f,p) and we have pi - pj = Pi - pj. For arcs (i,j) with i E I, j 4 I and fij < cij we have, using
Eqs. (17) and (18),
Pi -Pj = Pi -Pj + y < pi - pj + (pj + aij + e - pi) = aij + e,
so condition (8a) is satisfied. Similarly, using Eqs. (17) and (19), it is seen that for all arcs (j, i)
with i E I, j 4 I and fji > bji, condition (8b) is satisfied.
(b) Since S+ U S- is empty,
fij = cij, V (i,j) E A with i E I,j ~ I, (20)
fji = bji, V (i,j) E A with i E I,j q I. (21)
We have
0 < gi = si - a fij + E fji, (22)
ifI iXI f{(ij)EAliEIxj¢I} {(j,i)EAliEIjVI}
and by combining Eqs. (20)-(22), it follows that
0 < Esi E cij + E bji. (23)
iEI {(i-J)EAli EIjI} {(ji)EAliEIxj4I}
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Assume, to obtain a contradiction, that f' is a feasible flow vector. We have, by adding the condition
of zero surplus for all nodes i E I [cf. Eq. (1)],
0= Zsi - E f + E fyi
iEI {(ij)EAliEIj¢I} {(j,i)EAliEIj¢I} (24)
> E si - E cij + Z bji,
iEI {(ij)EAjiEIj¢I} {(ji)EAliEIj¢I}
which contradicts Eq. (23). Therefore problem (LNF) is infeasible. Q.E.D.
The Generic Algorithm
Suppose that problem (LNF) is feasible, and consider a pair (f,p) satisfying C-CS and gi 0 0 for
some node i. From the surplus definition of Eq. (6), we have EiEKN gi = EiENf si = 0, since for any
feasible flow vector f' and corresponding surpluses g', we have =iEA Si = 'iSE gi  0. Thus, there
must exist nodes with positive surplus as well as nodes with negative surplus. Let us fix a node i
with gi > 0. There are two possibilities:
(a) The push list of i is nonempty, in which case a 6-push at node i is possible.
(b) The push list of i is empty, in which case the set S+US- of Eqs. (18) and (19) corresponding
to the set I = {i} is nonempty, since (LNF) is feasible [cf. Lemma 1(b)]. Therefore from
Eqs. (17)-(19), a price rise of node i is substantive.
We have thus shown that if gi > 0 for some i and problem (LNF) is feasible, then either a 6-push
or a substantive price rise at node i is possible.
The preceding observations motivate a method, called generic algorithm, which starts with a pair
(f, p) satisfying e-CS and performs a sequence of iterations, each consisting of a finite (but positive)
number of 6-pushes and substantive price rises. Each iteration maintains e-CS by Lemma 1(a). The
algorithm keeps e at a fixed positive value, terminates only when gi < 0 for all nodes i, and satisfies
the following conditions:
Condition 1: Each 6-push is performed at a node i with gi > 0 and the flow increment 6 satisfies
6 < gi. Furthermore there exists S' > 0 such that for every 6-push we have S > S'.
Condition 2: Each price rise is performed on a set I with gi > 0 for all i E I.
All the methods of this paper will be shown to be special cases of the generic algorithm, and the
following result will be used to establish their validity.
Proposition 2: Assume that problem (LNF) is feasible. Then the generic algorithm cannot
perform an infinite number of 6-pushes.
Proof: We first make the following observations:
(a) The prices of all nodes are monotonically nondecreasing during the algorithm.
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(b) Once a node has nonnegative surplus, its surplus stays nonnegative thereafter. The reason is
that a 6-push at a node i cannot drive the surplus of i below zero (since 6 < gi by Condition
1), and can only increase the surplus of its neighboring nodes.
(c) If at some time a node has negative surplus, its price must have never been increased up to
that time, and therefore its price must be equal to its initial price. This is a consequence
of (b) above and the fact that by Condition 2, only nodes with nonnegative surplus can be
involved in a price rise.
Suppose to arrive at a contradiction that an infinite number of 6-pushes at a node i on an arc (i, j)
are performed. Because of Condition 1, an infinite number of 6-pushes must also be performed at
node j on the arc (i, j). This means that arc (i, j) becomes alternately c+-unblocked with gi > 0 and
e--unblocked with gj > 0 an infinite number of times, which implies that pi and pj must increase
by amounts of at least 2c an infinite number of times. Thus we have pi -, oo and pj -+ oo, while
either gi > 0 or gj > 0 at the start of an infinite number of 6-pushes. Let /'°° be the subset of nodes
whose prices diverge to oo. Since the algorithm never terminates, at all times there must exist a
node with negative surplus which, by (c) above, must have a constant price. It follows that K/f is
a strict subset of A/ in addition to being nonempty (since it contains i and j). Note also that, by
Condition 2 and (b) above, all the nodes in A/V° must have nonnegative surplus after some iteration.
To preserve e-CS, we must have, after a sufficient number of iterations,
fij = cij for all (i, j) E A with i E /°°, j 4 A/N°°,
fji = bji for all (j, i) E A4 with i E AJVo,j J Arco,
while the sum of surpluses of the nodes in A/°° must be positive at the start of the infinite number
of 6-pushes where either gi > 0 or gj > 0. This means that even with as much flow as arc capacities
allow coming out of AV°- to nodes j JV'° ° and as little flow as arc capacities allow coming into Af c
from nodes j ~ A/'c°, the total surplus "NiEiNo gi of nodes in A/'( can be positive. It follows that
there is no feasible flow vector contradicting the hypothesis. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 indicates that one can guarantee finite termination of the generic algorithm by
ensuring that a 6-push is performed at each iteration. The algorithms of the next section have
this property and therefore terminate finitely assuming that problem (LNF) is feasible. The vector
pair (f, p) obtained at termination satisfies e-CS and primal feasibility, so by Prop. 1, f is optimal
assuming that e < 1/N. The example of Fig. 1 shows how the generic algorithm may never terminate
even for a feasible problem, if there is no assurance of at least one 6-push per iteration.
Consider now what happens when problem (LNF) is infeasible. Let us assume that the generic
algorithm is operated so that it performs at least one 6-push per iteration, which is true for the
algorithms of the next section. Then either the algorithm will terminate with gi < 0 for all i and
gi < 0 for at least one i, in which case infeasibility will be detected, or else it will perform an infinite
number of iterations and consequently, an infinite number of S-pushes. In the latter case, from the
proof of Prop. 2 it can be seen that the prices of the nodes involved in an infinite number of 6-pushes
will diverge to infinity. This, together with a bound on the total price change of a node to be given
9~~~~~~~
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S~=1
Problem data: j ,j =j = , for all arcs (ij) and s 0, s2= 0, s3=1, s4= -1
Initially: fij = 0 for all arcs (i,j), and pi = 0 for all nodes i.
Figure 1: Example of a feasible problem where the generic algorithm does not terminate, because
it does not perform at least one 6-push per iteration. Here, the first iteration raises the price of node 1 by
e. Subsequent iterations consist of a price rise of node 2 by an increment of 2e followed by a price rise of
node 1 by an increment of 2e.
in Section 4 [cf. Eq. (32)], can be used to detect infeasibility. It may also be possible to detect
infeasibility by discovering in the course of the algorithm a subset of nodes I for which ZEEI gi > 0
and the sets of scalars S+ and S- of Eqs. (18) and (19) are empty [cf. Lemma 1(b)]. There is no
guarantee, however, that such a set will be encountered during the algorithm's execution.
3. THE NETWORK AUCTION ALGORITHM
The 6-push and price rise operations involving a single node are the essential steps of the c-
relaxation method, which is described below. We will provide a statement of this method, which
is equivalent with the ones given in other sources [Ber86a], [Ber86b], [BeE87], [BeE88], [Gol87a],
[GoT87]. We will subsequently describe the network auction algorithm, which is similar to c-
relaxation but uses in addition the reject operation as well as price rises involving sets with multiple
nodes. In both methods we assume that problem (LNF) is feasible. In practice, the methods should
be supplemented with additional mechanisms to detect infeasibility, as discussed at the end of the
preceding section.
We use a fixed positive value of e and we start with a pair (f,p) satisfying c-CS. Furthermore,
the starting arc flows are integer and it will be seen that the integrality of the arc flows is preserved
thanks to the integrality of the node supplies and the arc flow bounds. At the start of a typical
iteration of either algorithm we have a flow-price vector pair (f, p) satisfying c-CS and we select a
node i with gi > 0; if no such node can be found, the algorithm terminates. During the iteration
we perform several operations of the type described in the previous section involving node i and,
in the case of the network auction method, neighbor nodes of i (i.e., nodes connected to i with an
arc). As these operations are performed, with the attendant price and flow changes, some node
surpluses, reject capacities, and push lists are also modified. In our mathematical description of the
iteration we assume that these objects are automatically updated at the time when prices and arc
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flows change. We will discuss appropriate data structures and implementation details later, when
we provide a complexity analysis.
Typical Iteration of the e-Relaxation Method
Step 0: Select a node i with gi > 0. If no such node exists, terminate the algorithm; else go to Step
Step 1: If the push list of node i is empty go to Step 3; else select an arc a from the push list of i
and go to Step 2.
Step 2: Let j be the end-node of arc a, which is opposite to i. Let
6 = rnin{gi, cij -fj} if a = (i,j), (25)
min{gi, fji - bji} if a = (j, i).
Perform a 6-push of i on arc a. If as a result of this operation we obtain gi = 0, go to Step 3; else
go to Step 1.
Step 3: Perform a price rise of node i. If gi = 0 stop; else go to Step 1.
We claim that the above iteration consists of a finite (but positive) number of S-pushes and a
finite (possibly zero) number of price rises, which satisfy Conditions 1 and 2 of the generic algorithm.
Indeed, since the starting arc flows, the node supplies, and the arc flow bounds are integer, the flow
increments 6 of all 6-pushes will be positive integers throughout the algorithm. Furthermore, from
Eq. (25) it is seen that 6 < gi, so Condition 1 of the generic algorithm is satisfied. We also note
that at most one S-push per incident arc of node i is performed at each iteration because from Eq.
(25) it is seen that a 6-push on arc a in Step 2 is either saturating, which causes arc a to drop
out of the push list of i through the end of the iteration, or else results in gi = 0, which leads the
iteration to branch to Step 3 and subsequently stop. Therefore, the number of 6-pushes per iteration
is finite. In addition we have gi > 0 at the start and gi = 0 at the end of an iteration, so at least
one b-push must occur before an iteration can stop. Regarding price rises, it is seen that Step 3
can be reached under two conditions: a) the push list of i is empty and gi > 0, in which case the
price rise in Step 3 will be substantive [in view of the assumption that problem (LNF) is feasible
and Lemma 1(b)], and the iteration will branch to Step 1 with the push list of i having at least one
new arc, or b) gi = 0, in which case the iteration will stop following a (possibly trivial) price rise
in Step 3. Thus all price rises involve a node with nonnegative surplus and satisfy Condition 2 of
the generic algorithm. Since after each substantive price rise with gi > 0, at least one 6-push must
be performed, it follows that the number of substantive price rises per iteration is finite. Finally, as
argued earlier, there is at most one trivial price rise per iteration. From the preceding observations
it is seen that, assuming problem (LNF) is feasible, the c-relaxation method is a special case of the
generic algorithm. Furthermore, since it performs at least one 6-push per iteration, it terminates
finitely (by Prop. 2) with a feasible flow vector, which (by Prop. 1) is optimal if e < 1/N.
To describe the typical iteration of the network auction algorithm we need one more object, a
subset L of neighbor nodes of i, which is empty at the start of the iteration. The nodes in L are the
ones whose push list is emptied during the iteration using a reject operation. As a result, the prices
of all nodes in L can be increased at the end of the iteration. This will occur regardless of whether
u"~~-~~ll~'-"-~---~--- """"~~~1
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the price of i is also increased. The price increase of the nodes in L, however, often has the beneficial
effect of allowing a larger price increase for i than would otherwise be possible. A network auction
algorithm iteration for which the set L stays empty, is identical with a corresponding c-relaxation
iteration.
Typical Iteration of the Network Auction Algorithm
Step 0: Select a node i with gi > O. If no such node exists, terminate the algorithm; else set L = 0
and go to Step 1.
Step 1: Let P' be the set of arcs of the push list of i whose end-node opposite to i does not belong
to L. If P' is empty go to Step 3; else select an arc a from P' and go to Step 2.
Step 2: Let j be the end-node of arc a, which is opposite to i. If rj < gj, perform a reject operation
at node j, set L := L U {j}, and go to Step 1. Else let
6 min{rj -gj,gi,cij - fi} if a = (i,j), (26)
min{rj -gj, gi, fji - bji} if a = (j, i).
If 6 = rj - gj, perform a 6-push of i on arc a, perform a reject operation at node j, and set
L := L U {j}; else just perform a 6-push of i on arc a. If as a result of these operations we obtain
gi 0= go to Step 3; else go to Step 1.
Step 3: Perform a price rise of the set {i} U L. Then, if L ~ 0, perform a price rise of L. Then, if
gi = 0 stop; else set L = 0 and go to Step 1.
An alternative form of Step 3 is the following:
Alternative Form of Step 3: Perform a price rise of the set {i} U L. Then, if L $ 0, sequentially
perform a price rise of each of the nodes in L. Then, if gi = 0 stop; else set L = 0 and go to Step 1.
It can be shown that the above second form of Step 3 leads to larger price rises for transportation
problems than the first form, because for bipartite graphs, there is no arc joining any pair of nodes in
L. Therefore, the alternative form of Step 3 is preferable for bipartite problems, or more generally,
for problems where the nodes of the graph can be partitioned in two or more subsets such that there
is no arc connecting two nodes of the same subset.
It is also possible to consider variations of the network auction algorithm whereby an iteration
consists of a finite sequence of network auction and e-relaxation iterations, in any order. Such
combined iterations may be tailored to particular graph structures, thereby resulting in simpler
implementations.
Using similar reasoning as for the c-relaxation iteration, we can show that the network auction
algorithm is a special case of the generic algorithm. Indeed each iteration consists of 6-pushes, reject
operations, and price rises, and the 6 increments of all 6-pushes are positive integers. From Eq.
(26) it is seen that 6 < gi, while we have rj < gj whenever a node j enters the set L and a reject
operation is performed at j; this means that following a 6-push or a reject operation, the surplus
of the corresponding node is nonnegative, so Condition 1 of the generic algorithm is satisfied. Note
also that the argument of the proof of Prop. 2 can be adapted to show that the number of 6-pushes
per iteration is finite. Furthermore, since we have gi > 0 at the start and gi = 0 at the end of an
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iteration, it follows that at least one 6-push must occur before the iteration can stop. Regarding
price rises, we note that they involve nodes with nonnegative surplus, thereby satisfying Condition
2 of the generic algorithm. To show that the number of substantive price rises per iteration is finite,
note that with each substantive price rise, the reject capacity of either node i or a neighbor node
of i (belonging to L) is increased by an integer amount. It follows that the number of substantive
price rises per iteration cannot be infinite, since the reject capacity of each node is bounded and
the number of 6-pushes per iteration is finite. Finally, regarding the number of trivial price rises
per iteration, we note that the first price rise in Step 3 involving the set {i} U L will be trivial only
if the modified push list P' (cf. Step 1) is nonempty (the push lists of all nodes in L are empty
following the reject operation in Step 2), in which case we must have gi = 0 and the iteration will
stop at that visit to Step 3. Therefore with each visit to Step 3 except at most one, there will be at
least one substantive price rise. Since the number of substantive price rises is finite, it follows that
the number of visits to Step 3 is finite, implying that the number of trivial price rises is also finite.
Thus, the network auction algorithm is a special case of the generic algorithm and performs at least
one S-push per iteration. Therefore, Prop. 2 guarantees the termination of the algorithm. By Prop.
1, the flow vector obtained is optimal if e < 1/N.
Note that if the first price rise involving the set {i} U L in Step 3 is trivial and L is nonempty,
the subsequent price rise in Step 3 (or price rises, if the alternative form of Step 3 is used) involving
the set L will be substantive, since following the reject operation in Step 2, the push lists of all the
nodes in L are empty. Thus, with each visit to Step 3 for which the set L nonempty, there is a price
increase of all the nodes of L. Practical experience, as well as the complexity analysis of the next
section, suggest that high frequency and large size of price rises is a good performance indicator, so
the extra work needed to compute the set L is compensated by the associated extra price rises.
Relation to the Auction Algorithm for the Assignment Problem
We now show how the network auction algorithm yields as a special case the auction algorithm
of [Ber79], [Ber88]. Consider the assignment problem where the graph is bipartite, having n nodes
i with si = 1, called persons, and n nodes j with sj = -1, called objects. All arcs (i,j) connect
persons i with objects j, and the arc flow bounds are bij = 0 and cij = 1. We choose initially f and
p with the following properties:
(a) f and p satisfy c-CS.
(b) For all arcs (i,j), either fij = 0 or fij = 1. Furthermore if fij = 1, then the arc (i, j) belongs
to the push list of j.
(c) gi = 0 or gi = 1 for all persons i and gj = 0 or gj = -1 for all objects j.
It will be seen that the algorithm preserves these properties. The typical iteration of the network
auction algorithm starts with a person i with gi = 1 and if the push list of i is empty, it raises pi to
Pi = min {aij + pj + c} (27){j](ij)EA}
(Step 3); then chooses an arc (i,j) from the push list of i, increases fij to 1 (this is a 6-push with
6 = 1, which assigns person i to object j); then if j was assigned prior to the iteration to some person
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i', the iteration reduces fi'j to 0 [this is the reject operation at node j, canceling the assignment of
j to i', which is possible because (i',j) belongs to the push list of j by property (b) above]. The
price rises of Step 3 are now performed as follows with L being the singleton set {j}: the prices of i
and j are raised by an increment
min {aik + Pk + E -Pi (28){kl(i,k)EA,kjj)
(this is the price rise of the set {i} U L), and then the price of j is raised by 2c (this is the price
rise of L). Since at this point we have gi = 0, the iteration stops. It can be seen that at the end
of the iteration, c-CS holds, the arc (i,j) whose flow was changed from fij = 0 to fij = 1, is e--
unblocked, and the property gi = 0 or gi = 1 for all persons i and gj = 0 or gj = -1 for all objects
j is preserved. This allows the preceding iteration to be repeated as long as there are unassigned
persons and objects. If we view aik +Pk as the cost (negative value) of object k for person i, it can be
seen that object j was chosen as the object of minimum cost for person i at the start of the iteration.
From Eqs. (27) and (28), it is seen that the price of j was raised so that its cost is equal to 2c plus
the minimum object cost for i at the end of the iteration. This leads to the auction interpretation,
whereby a person selects its best object and bids up its price as much as possible, subject to the
constraint that the cost of the object is within 2c from the minimum cost of other objects should the
bid be accepted. We refer to [Ber88] and [BeE88] for further discussion and computational results
using the assignment auction algorithm.
Relation to the Transportation Auction Algorithm
The transportation auction algorithm of [BeC88] can be shown to be a variation of the network
auction algorithm, which exploits the special structure of transportation problems. For these prob-
lems, the graph is bipartite, having n nodes i with positive supply si, called sources, and n nodes j
with negative supply -dj, called sinks. All arcs (i, j) connect sources i with sinks j and the arc flow
bounds are bij = 0 and cij = min{si, dj). We now describe the steps in the transportation auction
algorithm of [BeC88] and simultaneously indicate how they can be related to steps of a combined
version of the network auction and c-relaxation algorithms.
The initial f and p are required to have the following properties:
(a) f and p satisfy c-CS.
(b) For all arcs (i, j), fij E [0, cij].
(c) 0 < gi < si for all sources i, and -dj < gj < 0 for all sinks j.
(d) For any sink j, we have gj < 0, and either rj = 0 or gj = 0.
These properties are preserved throughout the algorithm.
An iteration is started with a source i with 0 < gi [by properties (b) and (c) above, if no such
source can be found, f is feasible and the algorithm terminates]. If the push list of i is empty, we
first raise pi to
Pi = min {aij + pj + c},
{1j(i,j)EA}
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(this is a Step 3 with L = 0 in the network auction algorithm). Then, we choose an arc (i, j) from
the push list of i and compute
6 = min{rj - gj, gi,cij - fij,
[cf. Eq. (26)]. In the language of the transportation auction algorithm of [BeC88], source i "bids"
for 6 units of the demand of sink j [this is equivalent to a 6-push at i on arc (i, j)]. If the bid size S
is large enough to exhaust the reject capacity of the sink (i.e., if 6 = rj - gj), a reject operation is
performed at sink j (Step 2), and sink j is added to a list L of sinks. If the resulting surplus gi is
still positive, the above bidding operation is repeated until gi = 0 or until the push list of i is empty.
At the end of this step, the set L will consist of some sinks j with fij > 0.
The next step in the transportation auction algorithm of [BeC88] is to raise the prices and
construct new push lists for the source i and the sinks in L (cf. the alternative form of Step 3 of the
network auction algorithm). This is done in a manner which is equivalent to a price rise on the set
i U L, followed by a price rise on each sink in L (if L 0 0). Through this step, the price of each sink
j E L is raised to the highest level for which its push list is nonempty.
In the above construction, it is possible that there are sinks j for which fij was increased during
the bidding iteration of source i (cf. Step 2 of the network auction algorithm), but which were never
included in the set L. In order to preserve the property gj < 0 for all sinks j, the transportation
auction algorithm performs Step 2 of the c-relaxation method, repeatedly until the surplus of each
sink j 4 L with gj > 0 is shifted to sources in the push list of j, and gj is set to zero; such sources
must exist, for otherwise j would have been included in the set L. In this way, all bidding iterations
will start with source nodes, simplifying the implementation.
Following the above flow changes and price rises, we check whether gi > 0, in which case L is
reset to empty, and the iteration is in effect restarted with node i (i.e. we return to Step 1 of the
network auction algorithm); otherwise the iteration stops.
After the iteration has stopped, conditions (a) and (b) above are satisfied because all of the steps
are part of either the e-relaxation iteration or the network auction iteration. Furthermore, conditions
(c) and (d) are maintained by the sequence of operations described.
4. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS OF THE NETWORK AUCTION ALGORITHM
In this section, we derive a bound on the order of time required by a simple implementation
of the network auction algorithm. We then introduce a scaled version of the algorithm with a
O(N3 log(NC)) worst case time bound. Our analysis parallels a corresponding analysis of the c-
relaxation method given in [BeE87], [BeE88], and [BeT89], which in turn uses the sweep implemen-
tation ideas of [Ber86a] and some of the scaling ideas of [Gol86]. We first make some assumptions:
Assumption 1: Problem (LNF) is feasible.
Assumption 2: All arc cost coefficients are integer multiples of c.
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Assumption 3: All starting prices are integer multiples of e, all starting flows are integer, and
together they satisfy c-CS.
We assume that the push lists of the nodes, are maintained in a data structure that makes possible
the addition and deletion of a single arc in 0(1) time; this is true, for example if each push list Pi
is maintained in a doubly linked list. Then it is seen that selecting an arc in Step 1 takes 0(1)
time, updating the push list of node i following a 6-push in Step 2 takes 0(1) time per 6-push, and
updating the push list of a node i following a price rise involving node i in Step 3 takes O(di) time
per price rise and node, where di is the number of incident links of node i.
The Admissible Graph
A notion that is central in our analysis is the so called admissible graph, introduced in [Ber86a],
which consists of the push list arcs, except that the directions of those arcs that are incoming to the
corresponding nodes are reversed to make them consistent with the direction in which flow is pushed
in the network auction algorithm. Formally, the admissible graph is defined as G* = (N, A*), where
A* contains arc (i, j) if either (i, j) is an c+-unblocked arc, or (j, i) is e--unblocked arc. Note that
the admissible graph depends on the current pair (f,p) that satisfies c-CS and changes as the pair
(f, p) changes during the course of the algorithm. In particular, when there is a saturating push on
an arc, the arc is removed from A*. However, 6-pushes cannot create any new arcs of the admissible
graph. Furthermore, when there is a substantive price rise of a node set I in Step 3, all the arcs
(i, j) and (j, i) with i E I and j 4 I that belonged to A* prior to the price rise are removed from
A*, and an arc (i, j) is added to A* if either an arc (i, j) (or (j, i)) with i E I and j ~ I became
e+-unblocked (or e--unblocked, respectively), as a result of the price rise. Thus following the price
rise, there are no arcs (j, i) of the admissible graph that have a start node j 4 I and an end node
i E I, leading to the conclusion that price rises cannot create any new cycles of the admissible graph
(this will be shown more precisely in the proof of the subsequent Prop. 3). Our next assumption is
that:
Assumption 4: Initially, the admissible graph has no arcs.
Assumption 4 can be satisfied by setting initially fij = cij (or fij = bij) for all arcs (i, j) with
pi = pj + aij + e (pi = pj + aij - e, respectively). Under this assumption, the admissible graph is
initially acyclic and since, based on the preceding arguments, neither 6-pushes nor price rises can
create a cycle, we conclude that the admissible graph is acyclic throughout the algorithm. (Again
this will be shown formally as part of the proof of Prop. 3.)
The Sweep Implementation
In order to obtain the subsequent complexity bounds, we need a certain rule for choosing the
starting node in each iteration. This rule is the basis for the sweep implementation referred to
earlier, and uses an ordered list T of all the nodes, which is restructured repeatedly in the course of
the algorithm. The initial choice of the list can be arbitrary. We say that node i ranks higher (or
lower) than node j at some time, if the position of i in the list T is higher (or lower, respectively)
than the one of j at that time. The order of nodes in the list will be shown to be related to the
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admissible graph (see the proof of the subsequent Prop. 3). In particular, it will be seen that a node
i ranks higher than all nodes j such that there is a directed path from i to j in the admissible graph.
The order of nodes in T is changed only when there is a substantive price rise in Step 3. In
particular, if the price rise involves a set I, the nodes of I are placed -at the top of T in the order in
which they appear in T prior to the price rise. The position of the nodes not in I is not changed. Fig.
2 illustrated the rule for restructuring the list T following a price rise. We note that the restructuring
of T can be done in O(N) time per substantive price rise. In the case where the alternative form
of Step 3 of the network auction algorithm or Step 3 of the c-relaxation algorithm is used, the
restructuring of T can be done more simply, in time 0(1) per single node price increase, by placing
sequentially the nodes of L at the top of T as their price is increased. In practice one may want
to maintain T in an appropriate data structure, such as a linked list, to minimize the restructuring
overhead, but this is not necessary for the subsequent complexity bounds.
o 0
Nodes of set I 1
o 0
Order of nodes in list T Order of nodes in list T
before the price rise after the price rise
at the set i. at the set 1.
Figure 2 Illustration of the rule for restructuring the order of of nodes in the list T following a price
rise at the set I.
If a given iteration is started at node i, the list T is used to select the starting node i' for the
next iteration as follows:
Let Ni be the set of nodes that were ranking lower than i in T at the start of the given iteration
and whose price did not change during the iteration. If Ni contains nodes that have positive
surplus at the end of the iteration, then i' is chosen to be the highest ranking of these nodes;
otherwise i' is chosen to be the highest ranking node in T among all the nodes that have positive
surplus at the end of the iteration. (Thus, the algorithm goes down the list T selecting nodes
with positive surplus and when it reaches the bottom of the list, it returns to the top of the list.)
A sequence of iterations between two successive times that the algorithm starts an iteration with
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the highest ranking node with positive surplus is called a cycle. Note that the computation time for
selecting the starting node of an iteration by going down the list T and checking for a positive surplus
node, is O(N) per cycle. In practice one may want to employ some data structure to reduce this
overhead but this is not necessary for the complexity results of this section. Our final assumption
is:
Assumption 5: The starting nodes of iterations of the network auction algorithm are chosen as
described above.
Main Result
We begin the complexity analysis by introducing some terminology. For any path H, we denote
by s(H) and t(H) the start and end nodes of H, respectively, and by H+ and H- the sets of forward
and backward arcs of H, respectively, as the path is traversed in the direction from s(H) to t(H).
We say that the path is simple if it has no repeated nodes. For any price vector p and simple path
H, we define
dH(p) = max O, E (pi-pj - aij)- E (pi - pj - aij) 
(i,j)EH+ (i,j)EH-
= max O, Ps(H)-Pt(H)- aij + aij (29)
(i,j)EH+ (i,j)EH-
Note that the second term in the maximum above may be viewed as a "reduced cost length of H",
being the sum of the reduced costs (pi - pj - aij) over all forward arcs of H minus the sum of
(pi -pj - aij) over all backward arcs of H. It is seen that the following upper bound on dH(p) holds:
dH(p) < p+ - p- + L, (30)
where p+ = maxi pi, p- = mini pi, and L is the maximum simple path length, where the length of
each arc (i, j) is taken to be Jaij l. Since any simple path can have at most N - 1 arcs, it is seen that
when p+ - p- = 0(1), we have dH(p) = O(NC).
For any capacity-feasible flow vector f, we say that a simple path H is unblocked with respect to
f if we have fij < cij for all arcs (i, j) E H+ and we have fij > bij for all arcs (i,j) E H-.
For any price vector p and feasible flow vector f, denote
D(p, f) = max{dH(p) I H is a simple unblocked path with respect to f}.
In the exceptional case where there is no simple unblocked path with respect to f, we define D(p, f) =
0. In this case, we must have bij = cij for all (i, j) since any arc (i, j) with bij < cij gives rise to a
one-arc unblocked path with respect to f.
The scalar /3(p) given by
P(p) = min{D(p, f) I f is feasible}. (31)
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plays an important role in the subsequent analysis. The following result is shown for the c-relaxation
method in [BeE87], [BeE88], and [BeT89], based on showing that the relation
Pi - pO < (N - 1)E + 3(p° ) (32)
holds throughout the algorithm for all nodes i with gi > 0. The proof for the network auction
algorithm is identical:
Lemma 2: For every node, the total number of substantive price rises of a subset containing the
node, up to termination of the network auction algorithm, is O(N + ,(pO)/e), where p0 is the initial
price vector.
The price bound of Eq. (32) ensures that an infeasible problem instance can be detected by
checking whether the total price rise of any node exceeds a known upper bound to (N - 1)e +3 (p° )
(cf. the remarks at the end of Section 2).
Our main complexity result is the following:
Proposition 3: Let Assumptions 1-5 hold and let p0 be the initial price vector. Then the network
auction algorithm terminates in O(N3 + N2/3(pO)/e) time.
Proof: To economize on notation, we write 3 in place of 3l(p°). We will also need to distinguish
between nonsaturating 6-pushes in Step 2 for which 6 < rj -gj or 6 = rj - gj in Eq. (26); these
are called regular and irregular nonsaturating S-pushes, respectively. Note that for each irregular
6-push, the node j of Eq. (26) enters the set L and participates in a substantive price rise in the
subsequent Step 3. The dominant computational requirements of the network auction algorithm
are:
(1) The computation required for price rises and for updating the push lists of nodes involved
in the price rises.
(2) The computation required for restructuring the list T following price rises.
(3) The computation required for saturating b-pushes.
(4) The computation required for irregular nonsaturating 6-pushes.
(5) The computation required for regular nonsaturating S-pushes.
(6) The computation required for selecting a node i with gi > 0 in Step 0.
There is also additional computation for updating the reject capacities of various nodes, but this
work will be lumped into the work for S-pushes and price rises, with no effect on the subsequently
derived complexity bound.
We will show that the times required for the operations in (1)-(6) above can be estimated as
follows:
For (1), O(A(N + /c)).
For (2), O(N2(N +,1/e)); if the alternative form of Step 3 is used, the time required is O(A(N +
3/E,)).
For (3), O(A(N + 3/e)).
For (4), O(A(N + 3/c)).
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For (5), O(N2(N + /ce)).
For (6), 0 (N2(N + 3/c)).
Thus, we will obtain the desired O(N2(N + P/e)) time bound.
Indeed, since by Lemma 2, there are O(N + l/e) price increases for each node and a total of
O(N(N + /3/e)) price rises, the time required for (1) is O(A(N + /3/e)) and the time required for
(2) is O(N2(N + P/i)). If the alternative form of Step 3 is used, then the restructuring of the list
T can be done by placing sequentially the nodes of L at the top of T as their price is increased, so
that the time required for (2) is O(A(N + /cE)).
Whenever an arc flow is set to either the upper or the lower bound due to a saturating push at
one of the end nodes, it takes a price increase of at least 2e by the opposite end node before the arc
flow can change again. Therefore, there are O(N+ 3/e) saturating pushes per arc. The computation
time for each of these, including the time to remove the arc from the corresponding push list, is 0(1),
so the time required for (3) is O(A(N + //e)). Similarly, for each irregular nonsaturating 6-push
there is a price rise of the corresponding node j that enters the set L. Thus there are O(N + P/e)
irregular nonsaturating pushes per arc, and the time required for (4) is O(A(N + /cle)).
There remains to estimate the computational requirements for (5) and (6). At this point, we
will use the assumption that the algorithm is operated in cycles with the node order in each cycle
determined by the list T. We will demonstrate that the number of cycles up to termination is
O(N(N+13/e)). Given this, we argue that for each cycle, there can be only one regular nonsaturating
push per node in Step 2, for a total of O (N2(N + /3ie)) regular nonsaturating pushes. Since the time
required for each of these pushes is 0(1), the time required for (5) is O(N2(N +,3/c)). Furthermore,
the time to select a positive surplus node in Step 0 is O(N) per cycle, so the time required for (6)
is also O(N2(N + ,//e)). Thus the proof of the time estimates for the computations (1)-(6) stated
above will be completed.
To show that the number of cycles up to termination is O(N(N + P/e)), we use the admissible
graph G* = (N, A*) and we argue as follows: a node i is called a predecessor of a node j if a directed
path starting at i, ending at j, and having arcs oriented from i to j, exists in G*. First, we claim
that immediately following a price rise of a node set I, there are no arcs (j, i) in A* with j 0 I and
i E I. To see this, note that if (j, i) E A with j 0 I and i E I is c+-unblocked after the price rise,
we must have pj > pi + aji + e before the price rise, and, hence, fji = cji, implying that (i, j) is not
in A*. The c--unblocked case is similar, establishing the claim. We next claim that G* is always
acyclic. This is true initially because, by Assumption 4, A* is empty. b-pushes can only remove
arcs from A*, so G* can acquire a cycle only immediately after a price rise of a node set I, and
the cycle must include nodes of I as well as some nodes not in I. But since there are no arcs (j, i)
with j ¢ I and i E I in the admissible graph following the price rise, no such cycle is possible. This
establishes the second claim. Finally, we claim that the node list T maintained by the algorithm
will always be compatible with the partial order induced by G*, in the sense that every node will
always appear in the list after all its predecessors. Again this is initially true because A* starts out
empty. Furthermore a 6-push does not create new predecessor relationships, while after a price rise
of a node set node I, there can be no predecessor of a node in I which does not belong to I, while
the set I is moved to the top of the list before any possible descendants. This establishes the claim.
Let N+ be the set of nodes with positive surplus that have no predecessor with positive surplus,
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and let N o be the set of nodes with nonpositive surplus that have no predecessor with positive
surplus. Then, as long as no price rise takes place, all nodes in N o remain in N o , and execution
of an iteration starting at a node i E N+ moves i from N+ to N °. If there is no price rise during
a cycle, then all nodes of N+ will be added to N o by the end of the cycle, which implies that
the algorithm terminates. Therefore, there will be a price rise during every cycle except possibly
for the last one. Since the number of price increases per node is O(N + l/c), there can be only
O(N(N + /6c)) cycles.
The proof of the time estimates for (1)-(6) stated above is now complete and the desired overall
time bound for the algorithm follows. Q.E.D.
Note that in problems where the arc capacity range is [0, 1], such as for example the assignment
problem, there are no regular nonsaturating pushes. For this reason, to obtain a good complexity
bound, it is not necessary to maintain and restructure the list T as described earlier. Instead, a much
simpler FIFO queue that includes the nodes with positive surplus can be used. With this modification
in the algorithm it can be shown that the complexity bound is reduced to O(A(N + ,//)). Note
also that the classical max-flow problem can be formulated so that all arc costs aij are zero except
for one arc cost which is unity ([BeT89], p. 334), and with an initial price vector p0 such that
p+ -p- = 0(1), we have /(p 0 ) = 0(1) [cf. Eq. (30)]. By taking e = 1/(N + 1) in Prop. 3, it follows
that the network auction algorithm solves the problem in O(N3) time.
The Scaled Version of the Algorithm
We now describe a scaled version of the network auction algorithm. Its analysis is virtually
identical to the corresponding analysis of the c-relaxation method given in the sources mentioned
earlier.
Consider the problem obtained from (LNF) by multiplying all arc cost coefficients by N + 1, that
is, the problem with arc cost coefficients
atj = (N + l)aij, v (i,j) E A.
We refer to this problem as (SNLF). If a pair (f',p') satisfies 1-CS (namely, c-CS with C = 1) with
respect to (SLNF), then clearly the pair
satifies (N + 1-CS with respect to (LNF), and hence f is optimal for (LNF) by Prop. 1. In the
satifies (N + 1)-1-CS with respect to (LNF), and hence .f is optimal for (LNF) by Prop. 1. In the
scaled algorithm, we seek a 1-CS solution to (SLNF).
Let
M = Llog2(N + 1)CJ + 1 = O(log(NC)), (33)
where C = max(i,j)A laaij . In the scaled algorithm, we solve M subproblems. The mth subproblem
is a minimum cost flow problem, where the cost coefficient of each arc (i, j) is
aij(m) = Trunc (2 ) (34)
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where Trunc(-) denotes integer rounding in the direction of 0, that is, down for positive and up for
negative numbers. Note that aij (m) is the integer consisting of the m most significant bits in the M-
bit binary representation of aij3 . In particular each aij (1) is 0, +1, or -1, while aij (m + 1) is obtained
by doubling aij(m) and adding (subtracting) 1 if the (m + 1)st bit of the M-bit representation of
aij is a 1 and aij is positive (negative). Note also that
aij(M) = abj,
so the last problem of the sequence is (SLNF).
All problems in the sequence are solved by applying the e-relaxation algorithm using c = 1,
yielding upon termination a pair (ft(m),pt(m)) satisfying 1-CS with respect to the cost coefficients
aij(m). The algorithm is operated in cycles as per Assumption 4.
The starting pair (fO(1),p°(1)) for the first problem must be integer and must satisfy 1-CS. The
starting price vector for the (m + 1)st problem (m = 1, 2,..., M - 1) is
p°(m + 1) = 2pt(m), (35)
where pt(m) is the final price vector obtained from solution of the mth problem. Doubling pt(m)
as above roughly maintains complementary slackness since aij(m) is roughly doubled when passing
to the (m + 1)st problem. Indeed, it can be seen that every arc that was 1-balanced (1-active,
1-inactive) upon termination of the algorithm for the mth problem will be 3-balanced (1-active,
1-inactive, respectively) at the start of the (m + 1)st problem.
The starting flow vector f°(m + 1) for the (m + 1)st problem is obtained from f t (m) by setting
fio (m + 1) = fitj(m) if - e < Pi -pj - aij -< e,
f° (m + 1) = cij if pi - p - aij > c,
ft0 (m + 1) = bij if -E>p-pj-aijj
Note that this initialization method implies that the starting price and flow vector will be integer,
and that there will be no 1+-unblocked and 1--unblocked arcs initially for the (m + 1)st problem.
These facts guarantee that Assumptions 2, 3, and 4 are satisfied for the subproblems.
Based on Prop. 3, the scaled form of the algorithm solves the problem in O(MN3 + N 2B) time,
where
M
B = E aIm[pO(m)], (36)
m=l
and 3m (') is defined by Eq. (31) but with the modified cost coefficients aij(m) replacing aij in the
definition (29). We will need the following result, which is shown in [BeE87], [BeE88], and [BeT89]:
Lemma 3: If there exists a feasible flow vector f satisfying y-CS together with p for some y > 0,
then
o < p(p) < (N- 1)7.
We will show that 3m(pO(m)) = O(N) for every m, and we will then use Lemma 4 to obtain
the following result, which is identical to the one shown in [BeE87], [BeE88], and [BeT89] for the
e-relaxation method:
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Proposition 4: Assume that for the initial subproblem, Assumptions 1-5 are satisfied and
that p - pO = 0(1) for all arcs (i,j). The scaled form of the algorithm solves the problem in
O (N 3 log(NC)) time, where C = max(i,j)EA Iaij l.
Proof: Since initially we have pi - pO = 0(1) and aij(1) = 0(1) for all arcs (i,j), we obtain
dH (pO(1)) = O(N) for all H, and B1 (pO(1)) = O(N). We also have that the final flow vector ft(m)
obtained from the mth problem is feasible, and together with pO(m + 1) it can be easily seen to
satisfy 3-CS. It follows from Lemma 3 that ,m+l (pO(m + 1)) < 3(N - 1) = O(N) and the result
follows from Eq. (36) as discussed above. Q.E.D.
5. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS
We conducted a considerable amount of experimentation with various implementations of the
network auction algorithm for both specialized problems such as assignment and transportation, as
well as general linear transhipment problems.
Our purpose was to determine whether and to what extent, the network auction algorithm can
form the basis for codes that outperform current state-of-the-art codes. Our conclusions in summary
are:
(a) Auction algorithms perform extremely well for assignment problems (particularly sparse
ones), and for some types of transportation problems. We believe that problems with
a structure resembling the one of the assignment problem (bipartite or nearly bipartite
structure, small and/or uniform sized supplies, small arc capacities) are good candidates for
effective solution using specialized versions of the network auction algorithm.
(b) For general linear transhipment problems our results were disappointing; our best imple-
mentations of the network auction algorithm were much slower (by a factor of the order of
ten) than state-of-the-art relaxation codes, e.g. the RELAX codes [BeT88], which are based
on the relaxation methods of [Ber82], [BeT85], and for which no polynomial complexity
bounds are known. Implementations of the e-relaxation method proved to be even slower
for the same class of problems. Limited experimentation with max-flow problems showed
that for some problems (particularly dense ones), both network auction and e-relaxation
(without scaling) outperform substantially relaxation methods as well as the classical Ford-
Fulkerson primal-dual method (using breadth first search for labeling). There were other
max-flow problems, however, (particularly sparse ones), for which both network auction and
e-relaxation proved to be much slower.
Another purpose of our experimentation was to verify some of the insights from the complexity
analysis of the previous section. This analysis points the way to useful data structures and procedures
(such as the push lists and the sweep implementation), but on the whole, does not explain adequately
the practical performance of the network auction algorithm.
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For example, the complexity analysis suggests that the computations required for regular nonsat-
urating pushes and for selecting a node i with gi > 0 in Step 0 are the bottlenecks in the method's
performance. These are the only O(N3 log(NC)) portions of the computation when the alternative
Step 3 is used; all other portions require O(NA log(NC)) operations. Yet we found that in practice
the computation required for price rises is a far more important determinant of the performance of
the method.
Another conclusion of the complexity analysis is that scaling should be helpful in problems where
the scalar ,/(pO) grows proportionately with N and should be detrimental in problems where the
scalar l(p 0 ) is 0(1), e.g. in max-flow problems. We found both conclusions to be only partially true.
For example, those max-flow problems, which proved to be very difficult for both c-relaxation and
network auction without scaling, were solved much faster when c-scaling was used. Furthermore,
for dense assignment problems, scaling seems to be universally detrimental, except when the cost
range C is very large relative to the number of nodes. Some theoretical support for this conclusion
is provided by the fact that the unscaled auction algorithm solves dense assignment problems in
O(N3 C) operations, as shown in [Ber79], which is a more favorable estimate than the O(N 4 C)
bound implied by Prop. 3 with e = 1/(N + 1) and p+ - = 0(1) [cf. Eq. (30) with L = O(NC),
resulting in lI(p 0 ) = O(NC)].
We now present some representative computational results with assignment and transportation
problems. Most of our experimentation was done on an ENCORE MULTIMAX at Argonne Na-
tional Labs and with a random problem generator that we wrote. Our results were confirmed by
experimentation on a MAC-II and a VAX-750, and with random problems generated with the public
domain problem generator NETGEN [KNS74].
Assignment Problems
Here we tested a public domain implementation of the auction algorithm with e-scaling for the
assignment problem, which is called AUCTION and was originally written by Bertsekas in 1985.
We compared AUCTION with the code of Jonker and Volegnant [JoV87], abbreviated as JV code
in the following. The JV code consists of two phases. The first phase is an extensive initialization
procedure based on the relaxation method of [Ber81]; this method has several similarities with the
auction algorithm but is also fundamentally different in that it does not involve the notion of e-CS.
The second phase is an implementation of the Hungarian method based on the use of sequential
shortest paths. We found that for small and relatively dense problems, the great majority of sources
is assigned in the relaxation (first) phase, while for large and sparse problems, most of the sources
are assigned in the Hungarian (second) phase.
Several computational studies using the auction algorithm and the JV code have been presented
at various conferences recently by L. Hatai, J. Kennington, E. L. Perry, and M. Zaki. Collectively,
these studies suggest that for dense problems, none of the two algorithms dominate the other,
although there has been some disagreement on this point. For sparse problems, it has been reported
in [BeT88] that AUCTION outperforms the JV code by a large margin. This finding is reconfirmed
here but with much larger problems than reported elsewhere.
Our computational results are given in Figs. 3-6. To interpret these results, it is useful to consider
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the complexity bounds of the two algorithms; O(NAlog(NC)) for auction and O(N 3 ) for the two-
phase method underlying the JV code. This leads to the conjecture that AUCTION should be faster
on sparse problems and the JV code should be faster on dense problems.
ENCORE (secs)
5000
Assignment Problems
40G0 Constant Density = .0025
Cost Range = 1-100
3000 
2009 / AUTION
1000'
10000 20000
No. of
Objects
Figure 3: Comparison of AUCTION and the JV code for problems of constant density
A/N 2 = 0.0025. For large N AUCTION terminates roughly two and a half times faster.
In practice, the "average" computation times of both methods grow at a much lower rate with
N and A than their worst-case bounds suggest. However, for fixed C, the ratio of the practical
computation times seems to be roughly proportional to the ratio of the complexity bounds
Alog(NC) (37)N 2
(cf. Fig. 7). This empirical observation holds primarily for large and sparse problems, for which
AUCTION clearly dominates the JV code with the factor of superiority increasing as the ratio (37)
decreases. For dense problems, the relative performance of the two methods is much less predictable
and a similar hypothesis could not be verified. One possible reason is that, in contrast with sparse
problems, the solution of small and/or dense problems is essentially effected in the relaxation (first)
phase of the JV code, so the O(N3 ) complexity bound, which is based on the complexity of the phase
two, is misleading. Another possible reason is that c-scaling in AUCTION is much less helpful, and
even detrimental, when the problem is dense than when it is sparse. Generally, we found that for
dense problems the two codes are competitive with no clear trends emerging.
We mention also that in addition to depending on the expression (37), the ratio of the practical
computation times seems to depend somewhat on
C
Average Node Degree'
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ENCORE (secs)
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Assignment Problems
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Cost Range = 1-100
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0
_ /ACTiN10000 20000 30000
No. of Objects
Figure 4: Comparison of AUCTION and the JV code for problems of constant density
A/N 2 = 0.001. For large N AUCTION terminates roughly six and a half times faster.
ENCORE
_000
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Constant No. of Arcs = 1,000,000
Cost Range = 1-100
3000 JuS
2000 AUCION
1000
1000 2000No. of Objects
Figure 5: Comparison of AUCTION and the JV code for problems of constant average node
degree A/N = 50. The factor of superiority of AUCTION increases with N as the density A/N 2 decreases.
which may be viewed as a measure of "cost range increment per incident arc", and seems to affect
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Figure 6: Comparison of AUCTION and the JV code for problems of constant number of arcs
A = 1,000,000. The factor of superiority of AUCTION increases with N as the density A/N 2 decreases.
the "average" size of the price rises in AUCTION. In particular, large values of the expression (38)
result in larger times for the JV code relative to AUCTION, than would be predicted on the basis
of the complexity bound ratio (37).
Transportation Problems
Here we tested our auction code for solving transportation problems, called TRANSAUCTION,
against the state-of-the-art minimum cost flow code RELAX-II, described in [BeT85] and [BeT88].
TRANSAUCTION has been compared also with RELAX-II, as well as with the primal simplex
code RNET in [BeC88], but the experimentation reported here was done with much larger problems
than in [BeC88]. Our computational results, summarized in Figs. 8-11, generally agree with the
conclusions of [BeC88]. In particular, while TRANSAUCTION is not uniformly superior to RELAX-
II, it runs much faster for important classes of tranportation problems. Generally these problems
are characterized by two properties, which we call homogeneity and asymmetry. A homogeneous
problem is one for which there are only few levels of supply and demand. An asymmetric problem
is one for which the number of sources is much larger than the number of sinks. (In all of our
experiments, the problem was presented to TRANSAUCTION with the number of sources no less
than the number of sinks. We found out experimentally, that this is beneficial.) Homogeneous and
asymmetric problems arise in many types of applications, including some that motivated the present
study.
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Figure 7: Plots of the factor
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for the problems of Figs. 3-6. This factor is roughly constant for large N, indicating that the ratio of the
AUCTION and JV times is proportional to the ratio of the corresponding complexity bounds.
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